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OPINION
                                          
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Carlos Silva-Rengifo petitions for review of an en banc
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his
motion to reopen.  The government did not initially oppose that
motion.  However, after the Board granted permission to reopen,
the government petitioned for en banc review by the entire
Board.  The BIA’s en banc decision reversed the decision to
allow Silva-Rengifo to reopen his motion.  The en banc Board
held that Silva-Rengifo had not established a prima facie case
for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture
 Discretionary withholding of removal under former 81
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) is known as “section 212(c) relief.”
Relief in the form of a waiver of inadmissibility under this
section of the Act was eliminated by the Illegal Immigration
3
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (the “Convention” or the “CAT”) because he had
not shown governmental acquiescence in the torturous conduct.
For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the BIA’s en banc
decision and remand to the BIA for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Silva-Rengifo, a 47-year- old husband and father of three,
entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1968
when he was only 11 years old, and he has lived here
continuously for the past 38 years.  In 1990, he was convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in state court in
New Jersey, for which he was sentenced to a period of
incarceration of three and one-half years.
As a result of that conviction, removal proceedings began
against him in June 1991.  In 1993, after a full hearing, an
Immigration Judge found him removable and denied his
application for section 212(c) hardship relief.   The IJ1
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-54C (1996). But see INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
 There is a dispute about whether Silva-Rengifo received2
that letter and whether it was properly mailed to him.
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considered the equities that Silva-Rengifo presented, but
concluded that the equities and the evidence of family hardship
that would be caused by removal did not justify relief under
section 212(c).  Silva-Rengifo appealed the IJ’s decision to the
BIA.  The BIA rejected his appeal in December 1993.  Although
the BIA held that Silva-Rengifo was removable in 1993, the INS
took no steps to remove him for several years.  Seven years
later, on November 29, 2000, the INS issued a Form I-166, or
“bag-and-baggage” letter (requiring aliens with final removal
orders to report for deportation by a specified date)
implementing the BIA’s 1993 decision.
On July 26, 2001, Silva-Rengifo was arrested on a
warrant that issued after he failed to appear in response to the
Bag and Baggage letter.   Almost immediately thereafter, on2
July 31, 2001, he filed a motion with the BIA asking it to reopen
or reconsider the 1993 decision so that he could produce
evidence that would establish his eligibility for relief under the
 Silva-Rengifo also attached proof that he barely spoke3
Spanish, had no contacts in Colombia, and that his entire family,
including his wife and children, all resided in the United States.
This evidence was included to support reconsideration of his
request for 212(c) relief by the Board and his claim that he
should be allowed to present additional evidence of further
rehabilitation since the IJ’s 1993 rejection of his request for
equitable relief under § 212(c).
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CAT.  He argued that, due to changed country conditions since
the IJ’s 1993 decision, he would face an unacceptable risk of
death or serious injury if removed to Colombia.  The record
before the Board included documentary evidence of the changed
country conditions, including evidence of human rights abuses
and extrajudicial killings carried out by the government,
kidnapings by paramilitary and guerilla forces, and cooperation
or collusion between such groups and the government.  3
The BIA granted the motion to reopen in part, and denied
it in part. The Board relied on St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) to
deny reopening Silva-Rengifo’s section 212(c) application to
present additional evidence of his rehabilitation during the seven
years since the initial BIA decision.  However, the Board
granted the request for consideration of relief under the CAT.
The Board explained:
He also wishes the hearing to be reopened so that he can
6apply for asylum and withholding of deportation to
Colombia .  . . .  [He] is barred . . . from filing an asylum
or CAT application unless he can show changed
circumstances in his country of nationality or
extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay.
 
* * *
The respondent has demonstrated changed circumstances
in his country of nationality. The background information
demonstrates a significant deterioration in society since
his hearing.  His claim that he belongs to a persecuted
social group of foreign nationals or those perceived to be
foreign nationals is supported by the reports submitted
with this motion.  Therefore, we find he has made a
prima facie case of a well-founded fear of persecution to
qualify for asylum.  However, there is little evidence that
the government acquiesces in torture; this issue should be
developed at the hearing regarding whether he has not
demonstrated a (sic) eligibility for relief under the
Convention Against Torture.  See Matter of S-V-, Interim
Decision 3430 (BIA 2000). 
App. at 50.  The Board thereafter entered an order granting
Silva-Rengifo’s motion to reopen, and remanded the appeal to
the IJ for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The government responded to the BIA’s partial grant of
relief by petitioning for en banc reconsideration of the BIA’s
order.  As summarized in the BIA’s en banc decision, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) argued that Silva-
Rengifo’s application for relief was untimely, and that he had
not “set forth a prima facie case for eligibility under the CAT
7since he did not show that he was more likely than not to face
torture by those acting with the consent or acquiescence of
public officials.”  (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1),(7)).  
The en banc Board rejected DHS’s claim that Silva-
Rengifo’s motion to reopen was untimely, stating: “We stand by
our previous finding that the respondent can demonstrate
changed country conditions as a basis for justifying the late
filing of his application for relief.”  App. at 38.  (BIA en banc
Decision 2004).  However, the en banc Board nevertheless held
that allowing Silva-Rengifo to reopen was error because he had
not established that the Colombian government acquiesces to
torture.  The Board explained:
The respondent, however, did not provide
evidence of his prima facie eligibility for relief under the
Convention Against Torture because he failed to show
that any harm that might befall him in Colombia would
be meted out by the government or by those acting with
the consent or actual acquiescence of the government.  8
C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1), (7).  Protection under the
Convention Against Torture does not extend to those
who are harmed by groups that the government is unable
to control.  See Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306 (BIA
2000).  
App. at 38 (BIA en banc Decision 2004) (emphasis added).  The
Board concluded that “because the record contain[ed] little
evidence that the [Colombian] government acquiesces in torture
8of those perceived to be foreign, the respondent has failed to
demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief under the
Convention Against Torture, and, therefore, the motion to
reopen should have been denied.”  Id. at  38-39 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Silva-Rengifo then filed the instant petition for review of
the en banc decision.  He also filed for habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
He raised the following five claims for relief in his petition for
review: (1) the government had waived any challenge to his
prima facie case by failing to initially oppose his motion to
reopen; (2) the BIA erred in concluding that he had not
established a prima facie case; (3) he was wrongly precluded
from introducing additional evidence of his rehabilitation and
seeking reconsideration of the BIA’s 1993 decision; (4) the INS
was precluded from enforcing the initial order of removal
because of laches and/or equitable estoppel; and (5) his
underlying conviction should not be considered an “aggravated
felony” for immigration purposes. 
Pursuant to a motion by the government, Silva-Rengifo’s
habeas petition was transferred from the district court to this
 Cases so transferred are not subject to the thirty-day4
filing deadline in section 242(b)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.  REAL ID Act § 106(c); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(5); see also Kamara, 420 F.3d at 210.  
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court under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div.
B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (the “REAL ID Act”).  His original
petition for review is consolidated with the habeas petition
which we must treat as a petition for review, and both are now
before us.  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir.
2005).
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Jurisdiction
Under the REAL ID Act, a petition for review is now the
exclusive means of judicial review of all orders of removal
except those issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1).  See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2005).  Moreover, all habeas corpus
petitions filed by aliens seeking relief from removal that were
pending in the district courts on the date the REAL ID Act
became effective (May 11, 2005) were converted to petitions for
review and transferred to the appropriate court of appeals.  See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see also Hernandez v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2006).4
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 Accordingly, we now have before us two petitions for
review.  The first is the petition for review that Silva-Rengifo
filed in this court seeking review of the BIA’s en banc denial of
his motion to reopen.  As noted, there, the en banc Board denied
the motion based upon its conclusion that he had not
demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief under the CAT.
The second is the converted habeas petition that Silva-Rengifo
originally filed in the district court, challenging the
constitutionality of the removal proceedings.  
B.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Silva-Rengifo’s habeas corpus petition has now
been converted to a petition for review, our standard of review
remains the same.  “A review for ‘constitutional claims or
questions of law,’ as described in § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the
REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), mirrors our previously
enunciated standard of review over an alien's habeas petition.”
Kamara, 420 F.3d at 210-11.  Thus, we review Silva-Rengifo’s
constitutional and legal questions de novo, id., but defer to the
BIA’s reasonable interpretations of statutes it is charged with
administering.  INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424
(1999); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
11
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  
The same standard applies to Silva-Rengifo’s petition for
review under the REAL ID Act.  Prior to enactment of the
REAL ID Act, we would not have had jurisdiction to review
Silva-Rengifo’s claim because an alien who was removable
because of a conviction for an aggravated felony was statutorily
barred from petitioning a court of appeals for review of the
BIA's finding that he was ineligible for CAT relief.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(c).  However, the REAL ID Act eliminated
that barrier as to “constitutional claims or questions of law
raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court
of appeals.”   See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Kamara,
420 F.3d at 211 (noting that REAL ID Act’s jurisdictional grant
regarding appeals by aggravated felons extends not just to legal
determinations but also to application of law to facts).
Accordingly, we also afford de novo review to the BIA’s en
banc decision.
III.  DISCUSSION
As noted above, the en banc BIA reversed the order
allowing Silva-Rengifo to reopen his case  “because he failed to
show that any harm that might befall him in Colombia would be
  As noted above, the BIA stated that it was reversing its5
prior ruling because the record contained “little evidence that the
Colombian government acquiesces in torture of those perceived
to be foreign,” and because Silva-Rengifo had therefore “failed
to demonstrate a prima facie eligibility for relief under the
Convention . . . .”  Both explanations turn on the meaning of
“acquiescence” in the CAT.
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meted out by the government or by those acting with the consent
or actual acquiescence of the government.”  App. at 38. (Citing
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1),(7), and its earlier decision in Matter
of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000)).  Although Silva-
Rengifo raises four other issues in his petitions for review,
inasmuch as we will vacate the en banc decision based upon its
erroneous interpretation of the requirement for governmental
“acquiescence” under the CAT, we need not rule on his
remaining claims.  Rather, we will dismiss them without
prejudice to Silva-Rengifo’s ability to raise those arguments on
remand to the Board.  5
A.  The Convention Against Torture
The United States signed the Convention Against Torture
on April 18, 1988, and the Senate ratified it on October 27,
1990. 136 Cong. Rec. S17, 486-501 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
It became binding on the United States in November of 1991,
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after President Clinton delivered the ratifying documents to the
United Nations.  U.N. Doc. 571 Leg/SER.E/13.IV.9 (1995);
Convention, art. 27(2).   The Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”) initiated the
implementation of the Convention.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, div.
G., tit. XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 note).  That provision provides in part that “[n]o state
[shall] . . . expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to
another state where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  Id.
Accordingly, it became  “the policy of the United States not to
expel . . . or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture . . . .”  Id.; see also Li v. Ashcroft, 312 F.3d 1094, 1103
(9th Cir. 2002).
“An applicant for relief on the merits under [Article 3 of]
the Convention Against Torture bears the burden of establishing
‘that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured
if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”  Sevoian v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-175 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8
14
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  “The United States Senate specified this
standard, as well as many of the other standards that govern
relief under the Convention, in the several ‘understandings’ that
it imposed on the United States’ ratification of the Convention
Against Torture.”  Id. at 175 (citations omitted).  Unlike with
asylum or withholding of removal, an alien seeking relief under
the CAT need not establish that he/she is a “refugee” and
therefore need not establish that torture is inflicted “on account
of” any protected status.  See Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d. 719,
725  (3d Cir. 2003) (“A petition for protection under the
Convention Against Torture differs significantly from petitions
for asylum or withholding of removal because the alien need not
demonstrate that he will be tortured on account of a particular
belief or immutable characteristic.”).  Rather, he/she must
establish a likelihood of being subjected to torturous acts
inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis
added). 
“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public
official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness
15
of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”  8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a)(7).  If an alien produces sufficient evidence to satisfy
that burden, withholding of removal or deferring of removal is
mandatory.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16 - .18.  However, as shall
become clear from our discussion, the alien need not establish
actual knowledge by government officials of torturous conduct
particular to the petitioner. 
As noted at the outset, in denying Silva-Rengifo’s motion
to reopen, the en banc BIA reversed the Board’s 2001 decision.
The en banc Board relied upon the language of section
1208.18(a)(1) of the Convention’s implementing regulations
together with the Board’s decision in Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N
Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000).  The Board reasoned that Silva-Rengifo
had not established that any torture he might be subjected to
“would be meted out by the government or those acting with the
consent or actual acquiescence of the government,” and that the
Convention “does not extend to those who are harmed by groups
the government is unable to control.”  App. at 38 (emphasis
added).  
We cannot accept the Board’s conclusion that the
16
acquiescence that must be established under the CAT requires
actual knowledge of  torturous activity as required in Matter of
S-V-.  Similarly, although a government’s ability to control a
particular group may be relevant to an inquiry into governmental
acquiescence under the CAT, that inquiry does not turn on a
government’s “ability to control” persons or groups engaging in
torturous activity.  See, e.g. Tunis v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 547,
551 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the issue of the Sierra Leone
government’s ability to control torture by private individuals
i r re levan t w here  the  to r tu rous  ac t iv i ty— fem ale
circumcision—was legal and well-known to the government,
thus concluding the applicant for relief under the CAT had
satisfied her burden).  The CAT does not require an alien to
prove that the government in question approves of torture, or
that it consents to it.  Rather, as the court concluded in Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003), an alien can
satisfy the burden established for CAT relief by producing
sufficient evidence that the government in question is willfully
blind to such activities.  See id. (holding that Congress has made
clear that the correct inquiry under the Convention is whether an
applicant can show that public officials demonstrate “willful
 Governmental acquiescence under the Torture6
Convention has been defined to include governments who are
unable and unwilling to protect their citizens from persecution.
See, e.g., Orenelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060
(9th Cir. 2006) (Under the CAT “[i]t is enough that public
officials could have inferred the alleged torture was taking
place, remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because
of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.”) (citing Zheng,
332 F.3d at 1195 n.8); see also KRISTEN B. ROSATI, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A SELF-EXECUTING
TREATY THAT PREVENTS THE REMOVAL OF PERSONS INELIGIBLE
FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL, 26 Denv. J. Int'l
L. & Pol'y 533, 539 (1998); compare Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d
266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (to establish eligibility for asylum, an
applicant must demonstrate past persecution that is “committed
by the government or forces the government is unable or
unwilling to control”).
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blindness” to the torture of their citizens by third parties).   A6
closer look at the decision in Zheng illustrates this point.
Zheng, a native of China, petitioned for review of an
Immigration Judge’s decision denying his claim for relief under
the CAT.  Zheng had introduced evidence that he had been
smuggled out of China by “snakeheads,” professional smugglers
who were part of “an enormous organization” that was very
powerful and pervasive.  332 F.3d at 1189.  An expert testified
that people who failed to pay their debts to those smugglers
faced death or torture including dismemberment.  Id. at 1189
n.5.  Evidence showed that the People’s Republic of China
18
“would not protect” its citizens from the wrath of snakeheads
because “the existence of the snakeheads as a criminal syndicate
was not acknowledged by [the government].”  Id.  Interceding
on behalf of the syndicate’s victims would be tantamount to an
admission that the syndicate existed and cause the government
to “‘lose face,’ which ‘the Chinese government simply [was] not
going to do . . .’.”  Id.  (ellipsis in original).
Zheng testified that he was beaten and tortured by the
snakeheads on board the boat bound for the United States and
that he had been a material witness against some of these
snakeheads in a criminal proceeding following his arrival in the
continental United States from Guam.  Id. at 1189-90.  He
reported both the torture and the names of the seamen involved
in transporting him from China to Guam to United States
officials.  Id. at 1190.  After doing so, he was approached by a
snakehead while waiting to use the restroom and told to be
careful as he might “be dead for sure.”  Id.  Although Zheng had
not feared reprisal while remaining under the protection of the
United States government, he testified that if returned to China
he would be killed or tortured by snakeheads or their associates
and he therefore requested withholding of removal under the
19
CAT.  The IJ found that Zheng had testified credibly.  Id. at
1191.  
To establish that the Chinese government acquiesced in
the actions of the snakeheads, Zheng offered evidence of
collusion between snakeheads and government officials.  This
included testimony about an instance where Zheng saw
snakeheads give three cartons of cigarettes to police at the
harbor before his group was allowed to board the boat they were
smuggled out on, and evidence of several instances of
socializing between government officials and snakeheads.  Id.
at 1190-91.  Zheng argued that this established official
participation in the smuggling. 
The government opposed relief from removal, arguing
that Zheng’s testimony established nothing more than some
collusion between local government or provincial officials, and
that this did not establish acquiescence on the part of the
Chinese government.  The government’s position was
strengthened by a State Department Country Report on China
stating that it appeared to be taking “active measures to target
people smugglers [and that] . . . .  several scores of people
smugglers and [government officials] reportedly [had] been
20
convicted, fired from jobs, or expelled from the Communist
Party.”  Id. at 1191.
 The IJ rejected the government’s argument based upon
his conclusion that Zheng’s testimony established that the
government acquiesced to torture within the meaning of the
CAT.  The IJ granted withholding of removal under the CAT,
explaining that Zheng’s evidence established “that the
government condones or at least is not willing to interfere and,
in a way, acquiesces to the smugglers’ conduct.”  Id.  The INS
appealed to the BIA.  “The issue presented to the BIA was
whether [Zheng] failed to demonstrate acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity as required
by 8 C.F.R. 208.18.”  Id. at 1191 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“The INS argued that the Chinese government turning a
blind eye to its citizens being smuggled out of the country was
not tantamount to acquiescence to torture.”  Id. at 1192.  The
INS attempted to rigidly compartmentalize the illegal actions of
the snakeheads by claiming that, 
[e]ven if some Chinese police take bribes to let refugees
pass through checkpoints, this is a purely non-violent and
relatively benign offense.  It does not raise any inference
21
whatsoever that such bribe-takers would be amenable to
violence; i.e., that with prior knowledge they would
allow the commission of acts of . . . torture . . . .
Id.  (internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted,
emphasis in original).  The BIA sustained the INS’s appeal,
relying upon its decision in Matter of S-V-.  The BIA concluded
that even if factions within the Chinese government colluded in
the snakehead’s smuggling and took no action to stop it, that did
not establish that the government acquiesced in torture.  Zheng
petitioned for review to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
The resolution of Zheng’s petition for review  “hinge[d]
on the interpretation of the term acquiescence as used in 8
C.F.R. 208.18.”  Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1194 (emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeals rejected the rationale of Matter of S-V-,
and held that the Board’s interpretation of “acquiescence”
“impermissibly narrows Congress’ clear intent in implementing
relief under the Convention Against Torture.”  Id.  The court
concluded that Zheng did not have to establish the government’s
“actual knowledge” of torturous conduct as Matter of S-V-
required.  Rather, the court held that Zheng could establish the
requisite governmental acquiescence by showing that
22
government officials were willfully blind to the activities of the
snakeheads.  We agree.  We therefore reject the Board’s reliance
on Matter of S-V-  here.  
In Matter of S-V-, the BIA reviewed the removal order of
a Colombian national who was residing in the United States as
a lawful permanent resident when he was convicted of a crime
of violence.  The Board concluded he was removable, and the
alien sought relief arguing that, if returned to Colombia, “he
would be in danger from nongovernmental guerrilla,
narcotrafficking, and paramilitary groups in Colombia . . . . [He
claimed that] the guerillas finance their operations through
kidnaping . . . [and] that he would be a target for kidnapers
because he [had] family in the United States and [was] unable
to speak Spanish correctly.”  22 I&N Dec. at 1307.  He
submitted country reports and newspaper articles “detailing the
violence, including kidnaping . . . [and] a Department of State
travel warning stating that United States citizens have been the
victims of threats, kidnaping, hijacking, and murder . . . .” as
well as other reports and documentation.  Id.  
The BIA ruled that S-V- had not met his burden of
demonstrating that he was eligible for relief under the CAT
23
because he had not shown that the Colombian government’s
failure to protect its citizens “[was] the result of deliberate
acceptance of the guerillas’ activities.”  Id. at 1313.  The Board
noted that torturous conduct must be inflicted “‘by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.’” Id. at
1311 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). 
Zheng’s rejection of Matter of S-V- clarified the correct
standard for “acquiescence” as set forth in the legislative history
of the enactment of the CAT.  A brief review of the
Convention’s implementing legislation confirms that Congress
intended that relief under the Convention not be limited to
situations where public officials have actual knowledge of
torturous activity.  
The CAT was submitted to the Senate by President
Ronald Reagan for advice and consent on May 23, 1988.  See S.
Exec. Rep. 101-30, at 35 (1990).  Along with the Convention,
the President proposed 17 conditions, including an
understanding that acquiescence meant that the “‘public official,
prior to the activity constituting torture, [must] have knowledge
of such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to
24
intervene to prevent such activity.’”  Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361
F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting S. Exec.
Rep. 101-30, at 15 (1990)).  However, upon review of the
proposed conditions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
was concerned that “knowledge” was too limiting and “created
the impression that the United States was not serious in its
commitment to end torture worldwide.”  Id.; see also S. Exec.
Rep. 101-30, at 4 (1990).  These concerns were addressed two
years later when the first President Bush administration
submitted a revised and reduced list of proposed conditions.  Id.
The revised list contained an understanding of the definition of
acquiescence that required that an official have only
“awareness” of the torturous activity, rather than “knowledge.”
Id.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that
this change was intended to make it clear that both actual
knowledge and ‘willful blindness' fall within the
definition of the term ‘acquiescence.’  The Senate
adopted a resolution of advice and consent to ratification
of the Convention on October 27, 1990, subject to the
revised reservations, understandings, and declarations.
 
Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 170-71 (quotations and citations omitted)
(emphasis added).  The regulations reflect this intention.  See
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (requiring awareness, not knowledge of
 That condition is clearly satisfied if an alien can7
establish sufficient collusion between groups in the country, or
factions within the government itself, whose actions are
tolerated, if not condoned, by those in government.
25
torturous activity).  Notably, when President Clinton ultimately
deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations
on October 21, 1994, he included the Senate’s understandings
in the instrument of ratification.  See 1830 U.N.T.S. 320, 321
(1994).
As noted above, FARRA implements U.S. obligations
under the CAT.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G., tit. XXII, § 2242,
112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note).  The first
section of FARRA, § 2242(a), contains a general statement of
congressional policy not to return persons to countries where
there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be
in danger of being subjected to torture.    The following section,7
§ 2242(b), which substantively implements the Convention,
directs “the heads of the appropriate agencies” to “prescribe
regulations to implement the obligations of the United States
under Article 3 of the [Convention], subject to any reservations,
understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the
United States Senate resolution of ratification of the
  In addition to the language of the Convention itself and8
the Senate’s understandings, the Convention’s drafting history
also supports this conclusion.  The Second Circuit notes that the
consent or approval requirement would have been more
consistent with the text first proposed by Sweden in 1979.
Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 171.  It was the United States that
proposed broadening this text to include acquiescence.  Id.
(citing J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 4-42 (1988)).  The
text suggested by the United States would have defined “public
official” in Article 2 of the Convention to include those who
“fail to take appropriate measures to prevent or suppress torture
when such person has knowledge or should have knowledge that
torture has or is being committed and has the authority or is in
a position to take such measures . . . .” Burgers & Danelius,
Supra, at 42 (emphasis added).    
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Convention.”  8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 note.  Hence, the Convention
and its accompanying regulations must be read in conjunction
with the understandings prescribed by the Senate, which make
clear that the definition of “acquiescence” includes both actual
knowledge and “willful blindness.”  8
As in Zheng, the court in Khouzam also recognized the
import of the implementing legislation and senatorial
understandings of the Convention in analyzing the legal
standard for “acquiescence” under the CAT.  In Khouzam, the
Second Circuit granted relief to an Egyptian seeking protection
under the Convention on review of a final Board order.  361
F.3d 161.  Khouzam was an alien who was suspected by
 The court reversed the BIA deportation order on two9
bases, only one of which concerns our analysis here.  The first
basis for the court’s reversal was the BIA’s finding that
Khouzam was fleeing from prosecution of a crime and therefore
that any acts perpetrated against him would arise from a lawful
sanction and therefore did not constitute torture.  The court
found such a conclusion “patently erroneous.”  Khouzam, 361
F.3d at 169.  The court observed that “[i]t would totally
eviscerate the CAT . . . [if] once someone is accused of a crime
it is a legal impossibility for any abuse inflicted on that person
to constitute torture.”  Id.
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Egyptian authorities of having committed a murder.  Id. at 163.
He petitioned for relief from removal to Egypt based on
evidence that Egyptian police routinely exacted confessions
from accused criminals through torture.  Id. at 169.  The BIA
had rejected his claim, concluding that relief under the CAT
requires consent or approval of government officials.   Id. at9
169-70.  The court found this standard too high and reversed the
BIA’s decision, holding that relief under the CAT does not
require “consent or approval” to torturous conduct, but instead
“requires only that government officials know of or remain
willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal
responsibility to prevent it.”  Id. at 171 (emphasis added). 
The error in Matter of S-V- may have arisen from the
Board’s assumption that Congress “meant to exclude or modify”
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the legal effect of the Convention upon implementation.  See 22
I&N Dec. at 1312.  Based on this premise, the BIA interpreted
the implementing legislation as “limiting,” rather than
expanding or simply clarifying, the section of the CAT which
defines torturous acts as those committed with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official.  See id.  Such an assumption
is contrary to legislative history.
By attaching the aforementioned understanding, the
Senate could hardly have made it clearer that it did not intend
“acquiescence” in the Convention to require a showing that the
government in question was actually aware of the conduct that
constitutes torture.  Rather, an alien seeking relief under the
CAT can establish that the government in question acquiesces
to torture by showing that the government is willfully blind to a
group’s activities.  Any more restrictive reading of the CAT
would be inconsistent with the fact that the Senate ratified the
Convention only after attaching an understanding that
acquiescence does not require “actual knowledge.”  See  S.
Exec. Rep. 101-30, at 36 (1990).
“To interpret the term acquiescence as the BIA did . . .
misconstrues and ignores the clear Congressional intent quoted
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by the BIA merely a paragraph above its restrictive holding.”
Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1196.  “The definition of torture has been
properly left not to the INS, but to Congress, which instructed
the INS to ‘prescribe regulations to implement the obligations
of the United States under Article 3 of the [Convention] subject
to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisions
contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification
of the Convention.”  Id.  (brackets and emphasis in original). 
Here, the record establishes that Silva-Rengifo produced
evidence that may support a finding that the Colombian
government is in a collusive relationship with certain groups that
engage in torture.  The evidence may also support a finding that
the Colombian government actually participates in the type of
torture he fears, in that it fails to prosecute officials and groups
charged with human rights offenses.  In his motion to reopen,
Silva-Rengifo alleged:
Government forces continued to commit numerous,
serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, at a level
that was roughly similar to that of 1998. Despite some
prosecutions and convictions, the authorities rarely
brought officers of the security forces and the police
charged with human rights offenses to justice, and
impunity remains a problem . . . Paramilitary forces find
a ready support base within the military and police . . .
[There were n]o results reported in the investigation into
 In the analogous context of an asylum application, we10
have acknowledged that the Colombian government “has done
little to address the problem of links between its military and
paramilitary groups.”  Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 302 n.5
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Human Rights Watch, The “Sixth
Division”: Military-[P]aramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in
Colombia, Sept. 2001).
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cooperation between [the government’s anti-kidnaping]
squads and illegal paramilitary groups . . . Paramilitary
groups were also responsible for kidnapings.
A.R. at 330, 338 (citing 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, U.S. Dept. of State, February 25, 2000).10
Government participation in torture certainly suffices to
establish acquiescence under the CAT, but it is not necessary.
Evidence that officials turn a blind eye to certain groups’
torturous conduct is no less probative of government
acquiescence.  
We thus reject the reasoning in Matter of S-V- and the
rationale of the en banc Board in denying Silva-Rengifo’s
motion to reopen.  In this regard we join our sister circuits.  The
“willful blindness” standard has been adopted by those courts of
appeals that have addressed the legal standard for the
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not11
directly addressed the meaning of “acquiescence,” although the
issue has been presented to that court.  In Perinpanathan v. INS,
310 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2002), the court held that the petitioner
could not successfully argue that he feared torture by the
insurgent group, the “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam,” because
the Tigers are an illegal terrorist organization, “and its
participants cannot be considered government officials.” 310
F.3d at 599.  However, it is clear that the CAT is not limited to
torture inflicted by government officials.
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently12
affirmed the holding in Ontunez-Tursios, in Chen v. Gonzales,
No. 05-60379, 2006 WL 3374974 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006). 
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“acquiescence” under the CAT.   In addition to Zheng in the11
Ninth Circuit and Khouzam in the Second, the Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Circuits have adopted the “wilful blindness” standard for
acquiescence.  See Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 240
(4th Cir. 2004) (“awareness includes both actual knowledge and
willful blindness.”) (citing Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1194) (quotations
omitted); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341 (5th Cir.
2002);  Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2001).12
We are persuaded both by the the foregoing history of the
Convention’s implementing legislation, and the sound logic of
our sister circuit courts of appeals, that the definition of
“acquiescence” adopted in Matter of S-V- was the wrong legal
standard to apply.  For purposes of CAT claims, acquiescence
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to torture requires only that government officials remain
willfully blind to torturous conduct and breach their legal
responsibility to prevent it.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
Board’s en banc decision adopted an incorrect legal standard in
requiring official “consent” or “actual acquiescence” rather than
willful blindness as set out in the Convention’s implementing
regulations. 
B. Necessity of a Remand
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v.
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam), we do not review the
evidence under the correct standard for acquiescence to
determine if there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s
conclusion that Silva-Rengifo does not qualify for relief under
the Convention.  Rather, we must remand to the BIA to give the
BIA the first opportunity to apply the correct standard of
acquiescence.  See id. at 16 (“Generally speaking, a court of
appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a
matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”); see also




For the reasons set forth above, we grant Silva-Rengifo’s
petition for review, vacate the final order of removal, and
remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion, which rejects the Board’s erroneous reliance on Matter
of S-V-.  Silva-Rengifo’s remaining claims are dismissed
without prejudice and may be raised on remand for resolution by
the Board or on further remand to the Immigration Judge.
